FILED
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles

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# SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

VERA SEROVA,	Case No. BC548468
Plaintiff, v.	RULING ON SUBMITTED MATTER RE MOTIONS TO STRIKE (ANTI-SLAPP)
SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ET AL,	Hearing Date: December 7, 2016
Defendant	Assigned to: HON. ANN I. JONES Department 308
This court, having received and reviewed the pleadings, as well as the authorities cited therein	
and having heard oral argument, rules as follow	vs:
The special motions to strike pursuant to CCP §425.16 are	
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.	
BACKGROUND	
This is a consumer class action filed by Plaintiff Vera Serova ("Plaintiff"), individually and or	
behalf of similarly situated persons who purchased the songs "Breaking News," "Monster,"	
	Plaintiff, v.  SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ET AL, Defendant  This court, having received and reviewed the p and having heard oral argument, rules as follow  The special motions to strike pursuant to GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN P  BACKGROUND  This is a consumer class action filed by Plain

and/or "Keep Your Head Up" (collectively, "Songs") individually or as part of a compilation.

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The operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges that the Songs, which appeared on the posthumously released Michael Jackson ("Jackson") album *Michael*, were not authentic Jackson recordings. [¶¶10, 13] *Michael* was released on December 14, 2010, approximately eighteen months after Jackson's death. [¶ 10] The album contains ten tracks. [¶¶ 11, 27] Plaintiffs allege that the Songs were performed by a singer other than Michael Jackson "under the direction, and with the knowledge, cooperation, participation, and substantial assistance" of Defendants Edward Joseph Cascio ("Cascio"), James Victor Porte ("Porte"), and Angelikson Productions LLC ("Angelikson"), Cascio's production company. [¶¶7, 13]

The action is also brought against Defendants Sony Music Entertainment ("Sony"), John Branca ("Branca"), as co-executor of the Estate of Michael J. Jackson ("Estate"), and MJJ Productions, Inc. ("MJJ Productions"). Sony, the Estate, and MJJ Productions allegedly "remixed, edited, produced, and otherwise finalized" the Songs. [¶19]

The FAC alleges the following causes of action:

- (1) Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA")
- (2) Violation of the Unfair Competition Law ("UCL")
- (3) Fraud

Before the Court are two special motions to strike pursuant to CCP §425.16—one filed by Cascio, Porte, and Angelikson (collectively, "Angelikson Defendants") and another filed by Sony, Branca, and MJJ Productions (collectively, "Jackson Defendants").

In ruling on the motions, the Court considered the parties' original briefs and recently filed supplemental briefs.

## THE PARTIES' 4/18/16 JOINT STIPULATION

The parties agreed that the Court shall address the special motions to strike in "one or more phases." [¶1]

Solely for the purposes of deciding the first phase of the defendants' anti-SLAPP motions, the court was directed to "assume the following":

- (1) The November 11, 2010 statement alleged at FAC ¶22 was an e-mail from Howard Weitzman, Esq., to Jeff Jampol for distribution to Jackson fans. As set forth in the attachment to the stipulation, the e-mail was dated November 11, 2010 (shortly before the release of the album *Michael*) and asserted that the co-executors of the Jackson estate had conducted an investigation as to the authenticity of the vocals on the album. Further, that investigation confirmed that the lead vocals were, in fact, performed by Jackson. Given this objective evidence, Sony decided to release the album because they believed, without reservation, that the lead vocal on all the tracks were "sung by Michael Jackson."
- (2) The photocopies of the front and back covers of the CD album entitled *Michael*, including the enlargement of the statement on the album's back cover. The album's back cover lists the titles of the songs contained therein, including the following statement: "This album contains 9 previously unreleased vocal tracks performed by Michael Jackson. These tracks were recently completed using music from the original vocal tracks and music created by the credited producers."
- (3) A You Tube video which was a commercial for a "brand new album" from Michael Jackson. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://watch?v="https://w
- (4) A You Tube video showing a portion of the *Oprah Winfrey Show* where Edward Cascio appeared as a guest on December 6, 2010.<sup>2</sup> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzFR2aga5GE">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzFR2aga5GE</a>

<sup>1</sup> The Court grants the Jackson Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice as the album cover is a proposition that is not reasonably subject to dispute and is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy. See Evidence Code §452(h).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The FAC alleges that the episode aired on 12/6/14. This appears to be a typographical error.

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**DISCUSSION** 

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Further, by way of stipulation, the parties agreed that "[t]he first phase shall be limited to answering the questions: (1) whether Defendants have satisfied their burden on the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) if so:

- whether the various representations on which Plaintiff bases her [UCL and CLRA] a. claims constitute non-commercial speech and/or are inextricably intertwined with non-commercial speech, such that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under these statutes; and
- b. whether [specified] documents include any statements that a reasonable trier of fact could decide are sufficiently false or misleading to support a claim under the UCL or CLRA, assuming solely for purposes of this determination on the Motions that Michael Jackson did not sing the lead vocals on [the Songs]." [¶2]

They also agreed "[a]ll other issues potentia<mark>lly</mark> raised by the Motions, including, *inter alia*,

Plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case (if applicable), whether Mr. Weitzman's

November 11, 2010 public statement includes any false or misleading statements, and each

Defendant's responsibility for the various representations on which Plaintiff bases her claims,

shall be reserved for one or more subsequent phases, if necessary." [¶4]

The determination of whether an action is a SLAPP involves a two-step process. "First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity. 'A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).' If the court finds that such a showing has been made, it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88. "Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute-i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit-is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute." See Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 89 (italics in original).

# (1) FIRST PRONG OF THE ANTI-SLAPP ANALYSIS

"In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical point is whether the plaintiff's cause of action itself was based on an act in furtherance of the defendant's right of petition or free speech. 'A defendant meets this burden by demonstrating that the act underlying the plaintiff's cause fits one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16, subdivision (e)...." See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (italics in original). Those categories are: "(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." See CCP §425.16(e).

Here, the Angelikson Defendants argue that the 1<sup>st</sup> cause of action for Violation of the CLRA and 2<sup>nd</sup> cause of action for Violation of the UCL implicate protected activity under subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) of CCP §425.16. See Angelikson Defendants' Motion, §II. The Jackson Defendants make the same argument. See Jackson Defendants' Motion, §IV.

Plaintiff disagrees that the subject statements by Defendants are issues of public interest. Instead, Plaintiff describes them as "[c]ommercial speech about the properties of one's own product." See Opposition, 5:19-8:6 (citing to Nagel v. Twin Labs., Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 39, Scott v. Metabolife Intern., Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 404, Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 135, as modified (Feb. 26, 2004), and All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1186); see also Supplemental Opposition, 1:11-2:1 (citing additionally to Consumer Justice Center v. Trimedica International, Inc. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 595).

As requested by counsel for the Sony defendants during oral argument, the court shall consider this question individually for each of Plaintiff's claimed false assertions of authenticity: (1) the Weitzman e-mail; (2) the album cover; (3) the YouTube commercial; and (4) the *Oprah Winfrey Show* interview.

#### a. The Weitzman E-mail

Before *Michael* was released, the Songs became the subject of a public controversy when several individuals close to Jackson publicly disputed that Jackson had performed the lead vocals. [¶20]. Sony responded to these questions by expressing complete confidence in the results of their investigation and due diligence into the provenance of the Songs. [¶21] Further, Attorney Howard Weitzman released a further statement on behalf of the Jackson estate addressing the questions that had arisen regarding the authenticity of the Songs. [¶22]

A review of the Weitzman e-mail clearly establishes that these statements were made in a public forum about a matter of public interest. The nature of the communication – in response to an inquiry from an on-line investigator – was directed at the public at large and, more specifically, at the interested community of Jackson fans. As such, it is a public forum. See <a href="Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club">Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club</a> (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 468, 476. Further, the e-mail responded to a matter of public concern, i.e., the authenticity of certain recordings released posthumously and claimed to have been written and recorded by a pop superstar. See <a href="Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.">Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.</a> (2011) 193 Cal. App. 4th 142, 143 (2011) (an issue of public interest is any issue in which the public is interested).

## b. The *Oprah Winfrey Show* Interview

As a result of the same controversy regarding the provenance of the Songs on the *Michael* album, defendant Cascio was asked to and did appear with others on the *Oprah Winfrey Show*. During that interview, Cascio responded to the controversy by stating that Jackson had performed the lead vocals on the Songs.

As with the Weitzman e-mail, the statements made during the interview were directed at the public at large and the intended audience were Jackson's fans. Further, this interview was intended to and did address a matter of public concern – whether theses vocals were, in fact, performed by Jackson.

Plaintiffs' contention as to both the e-mail and the interview is that these are simply commercials or promotional statements regarding a product. Likening these statements to a label listing ingredients or a commercial promoting a product, plaintiffs contend that these two statements are not protected under section 425.16.

The court is not persuaded that either the e-mail or the interview can be so characterized. The cases upon which plaintiffs rely are distinguishable.

Nagel involved a list of ingredients. The Court of Appeal narrowly concluded that "a list of product ingredients on labels and a Web site is at the other end of the spectrum [of First Amendment protection] and is not protected speech under section 425.16." See Nagel, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 47. In rejecting the argument that the list of ingredients was speech "in connection with a public issue," the Court of Appeal gave two reasons. It explained that: (1) the phrase "in connection with a public issue" modifies earlier language referring to acts in furtherance of the constitutional right of free speech and cannot be read in isolation; and (2) the list of ingredients was not participation in the public dialogue on weight management. Id. at 47-48.

<u>Scott</u> arose out of a manufacturer's advertising of the safety and efficacy of its product (a dietary supplement called Metabolife 365). See <u>Scott</u>, *supra*, 115 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 423. According to the Court of Appeal, such advertising, which was merely "for the profit-generating purpose of selling that product to the consuming public," did not concern an issue of public interest. Id.

As for the e-mail and the interview, these statements were clearly part of a larger public dialogue regarding the authenticity of the Songs. Again, while both the e-mail and the interview discussed the Songs, the principal purpose of these communications was to respond to a matter of public interest, not simply to sell a product to the consuming product.

### c. The Album Cover and the YouTube Commercial

By contrast, the album cover – its title and cover art and the statement of attribution on the back of the CD cover -- and YouTube commercial advertising a new album by the best pop artist of all time did not result or evolve as part of any controversy regarding the authenticity of the Songs. Rather, the title of the album *Michael*, the picture of Michael Jackson on its cover, the statements on the backside of the CD cover, and the commercial advertising a "brand new album" by Michael Jackson were communicated as identifiers of the product "for the profit-generating purpose of selling that product to the consuming public."

It is well established that commercial speech that does nothing but promote a commercial product or service is not speech protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. CCP §425.17(c). The CD cover and YouTube commercial did not speak to the controversy surrounding the performance nor did it address or refute these allegations. The cover and commercial were created by persons primarily engaged in the business of identifying the artist responsible for the Songs and for selling the album and was based on representations of fact about

the product made for the purpose of promoting or securing sales. CCP §425.17 (c).

There is, however, an express statutory exception that applies even though the commercial speech exemption applies. An anti-SLAPP motion can be used to strike lawsuits against a person or entity based on the "creation, advertisement, or other promotion of musical work." CCP §425.17(d)(2). Clearly, the CD cover, statements regarding the contents of the album, and a commercial advertising its release fall within the scope of artistic works statutory exception as they are all statements regarding the creation of an artistic work.

Accordingly, anti-SLAPP motions remain available to the defendants as the producers and distributors of a musical work, such as the Songs in *Michael*.

The exception of CCP §425.17(d)(2), however, does not eliminate the need on the part of the defendants to show significant public interest in the conduct at the heart of the plaintiffs' complaint. Accordingly, while the SLAPP motion remains available, defendants must still show that the conduct here was "in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right to petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.

The cover art, the title of the album, the statements on the back of the album cover, and the YouTube Commercial describe the properties of the product contained within the cover. Like the label in *Nagel*, the cover and commercial were intended to advise the customer regarding the nature of the product inside the container and not to participate in a public dialogue. *See also* All One God Faith, *supra*, 183 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 1191. The Court of Appeal stated that "[i]n th[at] case, the use of the 'OASIS Organic' seal on member products is not activity directed to public discussion of organic standards in general, but is only speech about the contents and quality of the product." Id. at 1209; Consumer Justice Center, *supra*, 107 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> at 601 (the Court of Appeal

distinguished between speech about herbal supplements in general and commercial speech about the properties of a product.)

Nor does the cover art, the title or the description of the source of certain soundtracks as being Michael Jackson merge with or re-publish the musical expressions contained within the album. *Compare, e.g.,* Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 n.14 (1983) (speech likely to be expressive where the pamphlet advertises an activity itself protected by the First Amendment). Here, the lyrics are not reproduced and no aspect of the protected portions of the recordings are re-iterated or repeated as part of the advertising.

Rather, the only possible basis upon which a claim of protection could be based is the contention that the statements made on the cover and the video describing the album as being Michael Jackson are a matter of public interest solely because of the fame that the artist achieved. See No Doubt v. Activision Publishing Inc. (2011) 192 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1018, 1027. In No Doubt, the use of the likeness of a well-known band in a video game was a matter of public interest because "there is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities...." Similarly, in this case, calling an album *Michael*, with cover art resembling the artist, a claim of attribution on the back cover, and a commercial promising a new album from Michael Jackson would meet the first requirement of the anti-SLAPP statute. Michael Jackson's professional standing and accomplishments created legitimate and widespread attention to the release of a new album.

For these reasons, the court concludes that the e-mail, *Oprah* interview, title, cover art and disclosures on the cover of the *Michael* CD and the YouTube commercial promoting the album arise from protected activity.

# (2) SECOND PRONG OF THE ANTI-SLAPP ANALYSIS

As the Court has found that the defendants have shown that the challenged causes of action arises from protected activity, "it must then determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." See <a href="Navellier">Navellier</a>, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 88. "In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim. Put another way, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited." See <a href="Premier Medical Management Systems">Premier Medical Management Systems</a>, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 464, 476 (italics in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As indicated above, the parties' Joint Stipulation agreed that, in connection with the second prong, only the following questions will be answered:<sup>3</sup>

- whether the various representations on which Plaintiff bases her [UCL and CLRA] claims constitute non-commercial speech and/or are inextricably intertwined with non-commercial speech, such that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under these statutes; and
- whether [specified] documents include any statements that a reasonable trier of fact could decide are sufficiently false or misleading to support a claim under the UCL or CLRA, assuming solely for purposes of this determination on the Motions that Michael Jackson did not sing the lead vocals on [the Songs].
- a. Do the challenged statements constitute non-commercial speech and/or are inextricably intertwined with non-commercial speech?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Joint Stipulation, ¶2.

In <u>Kasky v. Nike, Inc.</u> (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, <u>as modified</u> (May 22, 2002), the plaintiff brought claims under Business & Professions Code §§17200 and 17500, alleging that Nike, "in response to public criticism, and to induce consumers to continue to buy its products, made false statements of fact about its labor practices and about working conditions in factories that make its products." See <u>Kasky</u>, *supra*, 27 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> at 945. The issue was "whether [Nike's] false statements are commercial or noncommercial speech for purposes of constitutional free speech analysis under the state and federal Constitutions." Id. at 946. The California Supreme Court explained that "[r]esolution of th[at] issue is important because commercial speech receives a lesser degree of constitutional protection than many other forms of expression, and because governments may entirely prohibit commercial speech that is false or misleading." Id.

According to the high court, "when a court must decide whether particular speech may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of commercial deception, categorizing a particular statement as commercial or noncommercial speech requires consideration of three elements: the speaker, the intended audience, and the content of the message." Id. at 960 (italics in original). Applying that test, it concluded that Nike's statements constituted commercial speech because: (1) the speakers (Nike and its officers and directors) were commercial speakers in that they made and sold athletic gear; (2) the statements were addressed directly to (or intended to reach or influence) actual and potential purchasers of Nike products; and (3) the statements regarding labor policies and practices and working conditions in factories where Nike products were made were factual representations of a commercial nature. Id. at 963.

Applying the <u>Kasky</u> test, Plaintiff here contends that all of the challenged statements are commercial speech. See Opposition, §§5.A to 5.D. As such, plaintiffs assert, these statements may be subjected to laws aimed at preventing false advertising or other forms of commercial deception.

Again, disaggregating the analysis, the court considers each of the alleged forms of speech separately.

#### i. Weitzman e-mail

As for the Weitzman e-mail, there is little doubt that this is not commercial speech. The audience for that communication was members of the public who doubted or questioned the authenticity of the vocal performance on the Songs. It was not motivated for the purpose of selling or promoting the good; it was directed at stemming a controversy regarding the veracity of the claims surrounding the release of the album. The contents of the communication reported the results of an investigation into the source of the vocals on the Songs. It was not a statement of fact as to how *Michael* was made. As it was not directed at a commercial audience and not intended to be a representation of fact of a commercial nature, it cannot fairly be characterized as commercial speech.

## ii. The *Oprah* interview

Nor can the *Oprah* interview be properly characterized under <u>Kasky</u> as commercial speech. The statements contained in the interview did not propose a commercial transaction. Nor can it be fairly concluded that the remarks made by Cascio during the interview were advertising. The statements regarding the performance on the album were mere seconds of a 17 minute interview into the secret relationship that Michael Jackson had with the entire Cascio family. It was not intended to, nor could it be considered to, "propose a commercial transaction." See <u>Rezec</u>, *supra*, 116 Cal. App. 4<sup>th</sup> at 141. Moreover, as discussed above, even this statement was given in response to an inquiry posed by Oprah Winfrey regarding the larger public controversy surrounding the authenticity of the vocal tracks on the Songs. These statements were directed to and intended to address a public controversy; they did not advertise or reference a product to further the speaker's economic motive. See <u>Kasky</u>, *supra*, at 945-47.

# iii. Cover (title, picture and statements) and YouTube Commercial

A harder question, however, is presented by the remaining two statements – the CD cover – its title, cover art, and statements of origin and the YouTube advertisement. In each of these instances, the speech is clearly advertising. The title and cover art promote and advertise the source of the album as Michael Jackson. The YouTube Video is nothing more than a commercial announcing the release of *Michael*. The commercial speaker (Sony) has designed a cover and titled the album as a way of making factual statements to an intended commercial audience of record buyers representing the origin of the product.

As Plaintiff also persuasively argues, the commercial speech is not "adjunct or incidental to" or inextricably intertwined" with the non-commercial content of the Songs. As explained in Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc. (1988) 487 U.S. 781, 796, this narrow exception applies when commercial speech "is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech." Where the component parts of a single speech are inextricably intertwined, the courts cannot parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another. *Id.* 

There is nothing inextricable about Defendants' commercial statements about Michael Jackson being the lead vocalist of the Songs and the non-commercial, protected content of those tracks. The decision by the producers of the album to call the tracks *Michael*, to use a picture of Michael Jackson as cover art, to assert that "[t]his album contains 9 previously unreleased vocal tracks performed by Michael Jackson," and to release a commercial advertising a new album from the greatest pop artist of all time are not components of the songs themselves. There is nothing inextricable about the presentation of these tracks and the commercial decision to name the album and design cover art and attribute the work to Michael Jackson. Nothing in this case prevented Defendants from giving the album a different

title and look or from electing not to attest to the authenticity of the recordings on the cover or in a commercial.

Nor is the *Michael* cover and commercial fairly likened to the yellow pages directories at issue in <u>Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle</u> (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2012) 696 F.3d 952, 962-65. In that case, the paid advertisements in the yellow pages were found to be inextricably intertwined with the telephone listings and community information that was non-commercial. Given the economic reality that the ads paid for the publication of the public information, these two elements could not be fairly parsed.

In this instance, however, Defendants' statements naming Jackson as the performer of the Songs are not economically mandated in order to release the Songs as part of a collection of recordings. A fair characterization of the questionable provenance of the voices on those Songs would not have effectively stopped the expressive activity altogether.

Moreover, the "adjunct or incidental to" exceptions do not apply to *false* advertising. See <u>Charles v. City of Los Angeles</u> (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3d 1146, 1156 ("Doctrines extending noncommercial status from a protected work to advertising for that work are justified only to the extent necessary to safeguard the ability to truthfully promote protected speech."). As the defendants have stipulated to the fact (for purposes of this motion only) that Michael Jackson did not sing the lead vocals on the Songs, the false nature of these statements further adds to the need to provide them nothing more than the protection ordinarily afforded commercial speech.

b. <u>Do Michael's cover and the video ad contain statements that a reasonable trier of fact could decide are sufficiently false or misleading?</u>

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that, <u>assuming Jackson did not perform the lead vocals</u> on the Songs,<sup>4</sup> the front and back covers of *Michael* and the video ad were likely to deceive a reasonable consumer.

*Michael's* front cover features art with images of Jackson and describes the album as "The Much Anticipated Album of Newly Completed Recordings." The back cover states: "This album contains 9<sup>5</sup> previously unreleased vocal tracks performed by Michael Jackson." Further, for songs that feature other artists (i.e., Akon, 50 Cent, and Lenny Kravitz), those artists are expressly credited on the album, and to the extent that someone other than Jackson performed the lead vocals, a reasonable consumer would expect a similar attribution.

As for the video ad, it describes *Michael* as "a brand new album from the greatest artist of all time." Coupled with the images of Jackson, a reasonable consumer would understand that Jackson is the referenced "artist." As Plaintiff also correctly argues, the fact that Jackson performed at least seven of the ten tracks on *Michael* is of no consequence. See <u>Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.</u> (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663, 682-683 (finding that a reasonable consumer would likely be deceived by "Made in U.S.A." representations on products that were partly manufactured abroad).

## (3) CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, the special motions to strike pursuant to CCP §425.16 are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Defendants have satisfied their burden on the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.

As for the second prong, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges violations of the UCL and CLRA based on the Weitzman e-mail and the Oprah Winfrey interview, the special motion to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This assumption is part of the parties' Joint Stipulation. See Joint Stipulation, ¶2.b.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Although there are 10 tracks on *Michael*, one of the tracks ("The Way You Love Me") was previously released in 2004. See FAC, ¶27.

strike is GRANTED. As these non-commercial statements are not actionable under these statutory schemes, Plaintiff cannot state a *prima facie* case.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges violations of the UCL and CLRA based on the album title, its cover art, and the statement on the back of the cover and the YouTube commercial promoting the album, plaintiffs have met their burden (based on the stipulation) of presenting a *prima facie* case sufficient to satisfy their burden on the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. As these purely commercial and not-inextricably intertwined false statements are likely to deceive a reasonable consumer, the special motion to strike the UCL and CLRA causes of action based on this conduct is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

DATED: December  $\frac{\mathcal{G}}{2}$ , 2016

ANN I. JONES

Judge of the Superior Court